Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya in Bangladesh marked the seventh anniversary from their homes in neighbouring Myanmar on 25 August 2024. It was a bleak event for Myanmar’s long-persecuted Muslim minority, who have faced miserable living conditions while they are huddled in the world’s most crowded refugee camps.
Since 2017, their status has been continuously contested by both intermittent hostility from Bangladesh and a ongoing civil war in Myanmar, where the military government continued to act harshly on the Homeland of the Rohingya in Rakhine State.
But recent events in Bangladesh may offer a glimmer of hope for the Rohingya. Months of political unrest have led to the ousting of the authoritarian prime ministerSheikh Hasina, whose government failed to find a solution to the refugee problem.
The new interim leader, Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, has promised to defend their rights as refugees and work towards their eventual repatriation.
As a scientist who has written about the Rohingya crisis and time spent in the refugee camps, I believe the odds are still stacked against the Rohingya. Policymakers must not only deal with growing hostility among local Bangladeshis and the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, but also with an underestimated third factor that is hampering a political solution to the crisis: the persistent and growing violence and infighting among Rohingya refugees.
Murder, rape and kidnapping
More than 750,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar in August 2017 after facing a brutal government crackdown. Since then, about 235 Rohingyas have been killed in refugee camps in Bangladesh. In addition, there have been dozens of cases of rape of Rohingya girls and women and dozens of abductions registered by the Bangladesh authorities.
The killing of prominent figures among the refugee population, including the 2021 murder of Mohib Ullaha moderate Rohingya leader, has contributed to the increasing violence in the camp.
Such violence, combined with terrible humanitarian conditionshave led to a security vacuum in the camp, which has been filled by various armed Rohingya groups operating with varying goals and methods, but which have created a kind of territorial conflict among the refugees living there.
Armed groups in the camps
Out 11 Known Active Rohingya Armed Groups – some of whom were involved in the insurgency in Rakhine State against the central government of Myanmar before crossing the border – and five are heavily involved in violent activities in the camps.
The most prominent of these is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation ArmyThe Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army was formed in 2016 in northern Rakhine state and rose to prominence after it carried out attacks on Myanmar security forces in October 2016 and August 2017, leading to stricter government measures against Rohingya and their exodus.
It is estimated that government forces have killed a number of people 25,000 Rohingyas and forced more than 750,000 people to leave the state in a campaign that led much of the international community to calling the violence a genocide.
The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’s attempt to gain control of Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh has sparked a backlash from other groups vying for their own position, including the Rohingya Solidarity Organization – a long-dormant group that resurfaced in Bangladesh in 2021 with support from the Bangladeshi security services.
Two other groups with ties to drug trafficking and other illicit trade – the former Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army Master Munna Group and the Nobi Hossain Group, which is nominally affiliated with the Rohingya Solidarity Organization — have contributed to the infighting. Meanwhile, the Islamic Mahaj Group tries to recruit members for the camp through his Islamist agenda.
Drug trafficking and drugs
The displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees has provided opportunities for criminal groups to expand their activities. Since 2017, illegal trade There has been a resurgence across the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, as well as the flow of arms from Myanmar and India, the smuggling of Yaba pills – a type of methamphetamine – and other drugs, trafficking in women and children, and the illegal sale of aid supplies.
Organizations such as the Master Munna and Nobi Hossain groups are involved in extortion, smuggling and organized crime in the refugee camps. They clash with each other to gain control over the area.
During my fieldwork in the camps, I have seen how panic can engulf refugee populations, especially after high-profile killings, as residents fear reprisals and increased clashes between armed groups. As a result, thousands of Rohingya have often shifted their residence from one camp to another in search of safety.
Fighting is good for Myanmar’s military
In addition to the toll this violence takes on its victims, the infighting and criminal activities of armed Rohingya groups also exact a political price on the refugees.
Myanmar uses the fighting as a pretext to blame Bangladesh for the ongoing unrest and to defend the treatment of the Rohingya as a legitimate security concern. In September 2020, Myanmar’s representatives at the United Nations General Assembly accused the Bangladeshi government of harboring “terrorists”a claim strongly denied by Bangladeshi diplomats.
The violence has also encouraged hostility among Bengalis to refugees, who are increasingly seen as troublemakers and criminals.
Meanwhile, non-governmental organizations and aid workers are being hampered in their ability to deliver services to refugees and civilians in the camps, and an already tired donor community sees risks in the increasing militancy and crime in the camps.
Old tension takes on new form
Tensions between different Rohingya refugee communities are not new. Before 2017, there were already problems between the registered those working for the UN refugee agency in Bangladesh and staying in official camps, and those who are unregistered and staying in makeshift camps.
But recently I have witnessed open hostility between earlier generations of Rohingya refugees who fled to Bangladesh in 1978 and 1991-1992 and the new arrivals of the 2017 exodus. What is different and especially alarming now is that after 2017 these tensions began to escalate into deadly violence.
The violence and killings in the camps included: according to my estimationabout 5,000 people. It represents a small part of the 1.3 million Rohingya refugees in total – including those who fled before and during the 2017 exodus. But the actions of this minority have been incredibly damaging to the Rohingya and their future, jeopardizing vital regional and global support and making their eventual return to Myanmar more uncertain.
The change of government in Bangladesh offers an opportunity for the Rohingya, especially if the new government keeps its promises to strengthen the country’s judicial institutions And protect minority groupsBut unrest in the camps will only compound the problems for the new government and could undermine support for a resolution to the Rohingya crisis.
There are fears that the Rohingya minority in Bangladesh will have to live in uncertain and increasingly violent conditions for many years to come.
This article has been republished from The conversationan independent, nonprofit organization that provides you with facts and analysis to help you better understand our complex world.
It was written by: Nasir Uddin, University of Chittagong.
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Nasir Uddin is not an employee of, an advisor to, an owner of shares in, or a recipient of funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond his academic appointment.
