Kursk invasion plan developed based on lessons from failed counterattack: retired Ukrainian officer

The invasion of Kursk, which has been underway for nine days now, is a “carefully planned” operation based largely on lessons learned by Ukraine from the failed counteroffensive of last summera retired high-ranking Ukrainian officer said The war zone on tuesday.

“After the failed counteroffensive operations in 2023, the continued delay in security assistance, and the challenges in mobilizing new manpower, Ukraine lost strategic and operational initiatives,” he said, speaking anonymously to discuss operational details. “The Kursk uprising, with its successful launch and continuation, will help improve morale among Ukrainian troops and hopefully, with additional security assistance from partners, will help regain these strategic, operational, and tactical initiatives.”

It wasn’t until Monday that the Ukrainian leadership provided operational details of the invasion, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declaring that his forces controlled nearly 400 square miles of territory in Kursk. The reason for the information blackout was to maintain the element of surprise, the retired officer explained. Still, some units posted their progress on social media, as in the video below.

“The secretive manner in which this operation was planned and executed shows that the Ukrainian side learned a lot from the failed counterattack, especially regarding the issue of strategic communications.”

One of the major failures of that operation was the combination of a long delay after repeated statements and months of speculation that it was looming. As a result, Russia knew where Ukraine was headed and had enough time to expand its fortifications in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and defend itself against it.

Another lesson is to fully embrace an “asymmetrical approach and demonstrate the ability to do it now,” an issue that has been “constantly raised by Western leaders.”

Unlike last summer’s attempts to cut Russia’s so-called land bridge to Crimea, this operation was designed with fewer troops and logistical requirements, the retired officer told us.

The idea was to “apply an effects-oriented approach to the planning and execution of operations by probing enemy vulnerabilities and taking advantage of our own limited resources and capabilities,” he said.

The invasion has four main objectives, the experienced officer analyzed.

The first is to “reduce the combat pressure of Russian forces on Ukraine and disrupt the Russian offensive operational tempo in eastern and southern Ukraine,” he explained.

The second is to “create more comfortable negotiating conditions when the time comes, based on strength,” he said, adding that Ukraine “will seize land in exchange for Ukrainian territories temporarily occupied by Russia.”

The third is to “demonstrate Russia’s strategic and operational vulnerability in the areas of security and defense, including the low combat readiness of conscript forces, enormous problems in border security, and ineffective political-military leadership, including Putin’s role therein.”

The fourth goal is to undermine Russia by “creating political and economic instability. The large number of internally displaced persons could help ordinary Russians understand the gravity of their problems.”

There are currently more than 10,000 Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast, the retired officer said. They are in Russia on a rotation basis, depending on the security situation elsewhere.

“Our forces are constantly moving to Kursk and back based on specific missions,” he said.

They will stay “as long as possible,” the retired officer said. “It is not considered a raid. It is a well-planned and coordinated operation.”

Ukraine’s efforts in Belgorod “depend on the success of the Kursk uprising,” he said. “They will go when it is easy, and stop when it is difficult.”

Fighting the battle within Russia achieves more than just holding territory.

“We have noticed a reduction in the use of glide bombs towards Kharkiv City of almost three to six times,” he said. “Normally this city would have to deal with 30 to 60 glide bomb launches daily. Now they are launching a maximum of 10.”

In addition, Ukrainian intelligence “has intercepted Russian communications to stop the systematic torture of Ukrainian POWs and prevent further deaths,” the retired officer said. Russia, he suggested, is seeking greater accountability for its actions with so many prisoners taken by Ukraine.

However, because Ukraine has invested large amounts of resources in Russia, several Ukrainian cities, such as Toretsk and Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region, are in great danger of being captured.

The invasion of Russia was launched with the knowledge of the challenges Ukraine faces in defending its own country, especially in the east, the retired officer said

“It has not changed the course of action,” he suggested. “There are a number of fronts and one of them is the East. I have a feeling that our action in Kursk and Belgorod should stimulate a new calculation.”

While the invasion may have been intended to relieve Russian pressure in Ukraine, some troops there say they have not yet seen results.

Ukraine has taken a huge gamble on the invasion of Kursk. Time will tell whether it pays off or whether it proves to be an unfortunate waste of resources at a time when Ukrainian forces are stretched thin. So far, the evidence points to the former.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com