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Is the Moscow-Kazan high-speed rail project on track?

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Moscow-Kazan high-speed line: a revolution in Russia

Think of Russia and rail travel and the first thing that comes to mind is probably the Trans-Siberian Railway, that epic, romantic journey of more than 9,000 km from Moscow through the Ural Mountains and on to the port city of Vladivostok in the frozen far east of the country.

Beloved by adventurers for more than a century, the Trans-Siberian Network was the world’s longest railway for decades, until that honor went to the Yiwu-Madrid Railway upon completion in 2014.

Now the next major station in the evolution of the Russian railway system has been reached in the form of the new Moscow-Kazan high-speed line.

With a length of over 700 km, the route is the first phase of the Russian part of a high-speed rail network between Europe and Asia that aims to improve freight transport between Beijing and Moscow, as well as mobility, interconnection and economic growth in the regions of Russia .

“The idea behind the construction of the Moscow-Kazan high-speed line was announced almost ten years ago, in 2009,” said Ivan Kondratenko, consulting analyst at Frost & Sullivan. “At the time, this was justified by improving industry innovation and increasing population mobility along the rail route of about 15 million citizens by creating large agglomerations.

“The original plan was to extend the line to Yekaterinburg by 2030 with the ultimate goal of completing the 7,000 km line connecting Moscow and Beijing.

“The accumulated high-speed rail projects in Russia by 2030 will amount to 4,300 km. However, the Russian economy and state budget are currently not in the best shape to handle large infrastructure objects, so such achievements remain questionable as no real actions and constructions have taken place yet,” he says. “If Russian Railways wants to complete their projects, attracting foreign partners for financing and technology sharing is crucial.”

Vital statistics: Chinese financing and expected passenger numbers

The deterioration of Russian relations with the West and subsequent Western sanctions undermined interest in the Moscow-Kazan project of European conglomerates such as Siemens and SNCF.

In April 2016, China Railway International Group stepped in and agreed to provide a loan of RUB 400 billion ($6.2 billion) for the construction of the Moscow-Kazan railway line over 20 years.

“China has expressed interest in participating in the project as part of the construction of the high-speed rail network between Moscow and Beijing,” Kondratenko said. “One of the main conditions from the Chinese side was the use of their technology and equipment for construction. Due to underdeveloped local capacity and lack of access to Western technologies, Russian counterparts agreed to these conditions.”

“The high-speed line will reduce the travel time between Moscow and Kazan from 14 hours to 3:17 hours.”

The project is being developed by JSC High-Speed ​​​​Rail Lines, a subsidiary of JSC Russian Railways, through a public-private partnership (PPP) and total financing for the project is expected to be obtained through additional PPPs, as well as from national funds. and private investors.

“The initial budget for the Moscow-Kazan part of the project was estimated at almost RUB1 trillion in 2013,” says Kondratenko. “However, as of 2018, while the work is still in the early planning stages, the estimated cost has risen to almost 1.7 billion rubles (approximately US$25 billion), with 700 billion rubles of this likely to come in the form of non- refundable grant from the Russian government. Government.”

The line is expected to serve approximately 10.5 million passengers in its first year of operation, with an estimated passenger capacity of 20 million per year by 2035, and 25 million per year by 2050.

Russian Railways plans to run 300-metre-long bullet trains on the route. The trains will have an operating speed of 360 km/h and a maximum speed of 440 km/h.

Kondratenko is somewhat skeptical about the expected impact of the line on mobility among Russia’s regional population.

“There will be some increase, but according to Russian Railways, the estimated number of passengers on the line should reach 10 million annually by 2030, which is actually eight times higher than the current number of passengers,” he says.

“Many experts are skeptical about this figure – there is no reasonable justification for such an increase, as the income level in Russia’s regions is not high enough to afford travel on high-speed trains.

“According to the authors of the project, the multiplier effect on GDP after completion of the project should be seven times higher than the total cost of the project,” he adds. “Again, there are no concrete justifications for these numbers.”

Fast track: will the new Moscow-Kazan high-speed line be affordable?

The issue of affordability for average Russians is a recurring theme and one of the reasons Kondratenko cites why high-speed rail has historically failed to gain traction in the country.

“There is a problem surrounding the purchasing power of local citizens,” he confirms. “High-speed train tickets are generally comparable to airline tickets; for example, for the entire route from Moscow to Kazan it should be about $60, comparable to the price of an airline ticket.

“For people who can afford to travel, it makes more sense to choose faster planes, and for people with limited financial resources, longer times on routes with usual non-high-speed trains are justified by lower ticket prices.

“However, current rail, road and air routes are significantly more time-consuming than the expected high-speed line, and the main benefit of the project is that the travel time between Moscow and Kazan will be reduced from 14 hours to just over three hours. o’clock.”

“If Russian Railways wants to complete their projects, attracting foreign partners for financing and technology sharing is crucial.”

“The main reason for the lack of a developed high-speed rail network in Russia is the sheer size of the country,” Kondratenko added. “From Moscow alone, the route to Kazan from west to east would be 790 km long – and this is not even half of the country.

“Furthermore, the costs of developing such networks are too high for railroads to become profitable within decades, if they are profitable at all.”

Critics have argued that the introduction of some high-speed lines has led to more affordable long-distance and commuter services being delayed or cancelled. Is the feeling that high-speed rail in Russia benefits urban, affluent elites at the expense of rural passengers justified?

“There are currently no real high-speed lines in Russia,” Kondratenko emphasizes. “On the current Moscow-St. Petersburg route you can travel at a maximum speed of 250 km/h and trains still run at more affordable prices on alternative routes.”

Technical ambition: project timelines and next-generation bullet trains

The new high-speed route will be built in twelve phases, with construction of the Moscow-Kazan section originally scheduled to begin in 2018.

“As of 2018, while work is still in the early planning stages, the estimated cost has risen to almost RUB 1.7 trillion (approximately US$25 billion).”

“The plan is to complete the line to Kazan by 2024,” Kondratenko said. “It was initially expected to be completed in 2018, before the World Cup in Russia, but as it is still in the early stages of development, the timeline could be revised again.”

“The line is also expected to be used as a freight route, and if the wider Moscow-Beijing railway project is built, it could potentially increase convenience and shorten the time of freight transportation.”

Whether or not ordinary Russians are willing or able to join their country’s multibillion-dollar high-speed rail revolution remains to be seen.

“Russian Revolution: Is the Moscow-Kazan High-Speed ​​Rail Project on Track?” was originally created and published by Railway technologya brand owned by GlobalData.


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