MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Oct 4 (IPS) – The UN Office on Drugs and Crime greets the recently agreed Cybercrime Convention as a ‘milestone step’ in cooperation to tackle online dangers. But human rights organizations are not so sure.
The is ominous solution which initiated the process, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2019 sponsored by authoritarian Russia and supported by some countries around the world most repressive states. Some of them already had cybercrime laws that they used to suppress legitimate dissent. Much more have since passed similar laws.
When Russia’s resolution was put to the vote, the EU, the US and many other states, in addition to human rights and digital rights organizations, urged states to reject it. But once the resolution was adopted, they had to engage in the process of trying to avoid the worst possible outcome: a treaty without human rights guarantees that could be used as a repressive tool.
They managed to temper some of the worst aspects of the early designs, but the results still leave a lot to be desired.
The treaty process
The December 2019 resolution established an ad hoc committee (AHC) to lead the negotiations, open to the participation of all UN Member States plus others as observers, including civil society.
The pandemic delayed the process and the AHC’s first meeting, focused on procedural rules, took place in mid-2021. Brazil’s proposal to require a two-thirds majority for decisions when states could not reach consensus prevailed over the simple majority rule favored by Russia. The AHC approved a list of eligible stakeholders, including civil society organizations (CSOs), academic institutions and private sector representatives.
Another important decision was made during the first negotiating session in February 2022: consultations would take place between negotiations, including for civil society organizations, to provide input and feedback. Numerous civil society organizations in the field of human rights and digital rights participated, often in coalitions. They submitted written comments, attended face-to-face and online meetings, and conducted oral interventions.
Damage control
Ahead of the first negotiating session, some 130 organizations and experts signed a letter urging the AHC to ensure that the treaty included human rights protections, warning that it could otherwise become “a powerful weapon of oppression.” become. They faced numerous states that disagreed with the need for human rights protection.
In April 2022, many states that initially opposed the treaty began actively participating, so civil society focused on damage control. By then, it was clear that there was no clear definition of what constitutes cybercrime and what crimes the treaty should regulate. Several states have aggressively pushed for broad and ambiguous provisions that they said were necessary to combat extremism, hate speech and terrorism.
Civil society insisted the treaty should not be overly broad and should only cover fundamental cybercrime or cyber-dependent crimes: crimes committed against computer systems, networks and data, including hacking, interference of computer systems, ransomware and the spread of malware. And even when it comes to these crimes, civil society warned, treaty provisions should not apply to security research, the work of whistleblowers and other actions that benefit the public.
Civil society has pushed for the exclusion of cybercrime: crimes that can be facilitated by ICT, but can also be committed without ICT, such as arms and drug trafficking, money laundering and the distribution of counterfeit goods. This category could potentially include numerous crimes that would suppress the online exercise of civil liberties.
A second major concern was the scope and conditions for international cooperation. Here too, civil society pushed for clear definitions and a limited scope. It argued that collaboration arrangements, if not clearly defined, could lead to increased surveillance and bulk data sharing, which would breach privacy and data protection provisions. It warned that in the absence of the principle of double criminality – which means that extradition can only apply to an act that constitutes a crime in both the country making the request and the country receiving the request – state authorities could be led to investigate activities that are not. t crimes in their country on behalf of other states. They could actually become enforcers of the oppression of others.
Technology companies also shared civil society’s concerns about the potential for extensive electronic surveillance in the name of fighting crime.
Human rights sidelined
Civil society representatives consider the final draft not as bad as it could have been, but it is still missing clear, specific and enforceable human rights protections. Rather than applying them as international standards, the Convention leaves human rights guarantees to the domestic law of each state.
Civil society advocacy has led to improvements over initial drafts, including an expanded article on human rights referring to civil liberties, and the inclusion of the right to an effective remedy in the article on conditions and guarantees. The most blatant attempts to weaponize the treaty and criminalize speech failed, although some cybercrime still found its way into the text. The activities of journalists, security researchers and whistleblowers are not sufficiently protected.
The treaty includes a chapter on crimes against computer systems, networks and data, plus a limited number of cybercrimes, such as child sexual abuse. But while the list of crimes is narrower than initially proposed, the scope of cooperation in data collection and sharing continued to expand widercreating real dangers of state excess in the form of surveillance and violation of privacy.
Still time
It’s not game over yet. The final text will soon be put to a vote by member states in the UN General Assembly and, assuming a majority approves it, states will then have to ratify the treaty. At least 40 ratifications will be needed before it comes into force, a process that will likely take several years. Two years after the vote in the General Assembly, negotiations are expected to begin on an additional protocol covering further crimes. This protocol will only be finalized after sixty states have ratified the treaty. Civil society fears that this is the moment when the worst proposals to criminalize speech will resurface.
Civil society will do that encourage governments to reject the treaty and adopt a human rights-based approach instead. Once the UN General Assembly approves the treaty, civil society will warn of the dangers it poses to human rights and civil liberties and oppose ratification.
With or without an international convention, civil society will continue its efforts to ensure that cybercrime legislation at all levels meets the highest human rights standards, including respect for civil liberties, and is not used as a tool of repression.
Ines M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS lens and co-author of Report on the state of civil society.
A longer version of this article is available here.
For interviews or more information, please contact (email protected).
© Inter Press Service (2024) — All rights reservedOriginal source: Inter Press Service